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COMMENTS
THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF
EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL
MATTERS: THE EXCLUSIVE AND MANDATORY
PROCEDURES FOR DISCOVERY ABROAD
INTRODUCTION
Lawsuits involving foreign parties present American litigants and
courts with unique problems. In addition to questions of jurisdiction
over the foreign parties and choice of law, one of the most persistent
and challenging problems has been to determine the procedure by
which evidence located in foreign nations may be obtained.
American courts have long struggled with the legal questions
raised when an American discovery rule or policy is frustrated by for-
eign statutes or procedures governing the taking of evidence abroad.'
These cases have typically involved confrontations with foreign "block-
ing statutes," which impose a variety of civil or criminal penalties for
the removal of evidence from the country. When a party asserts a for-
eign blocking statute as a defense to a discovery request, a court is faced
with a choice between denying the discovery requested or ordering the
commission of acts that violate the law of the situs of the evidence.2
I For a survey of the history of United States recognition of foreign laws when in
conflict with American policies, see Onkelinx, Conflict of International Jurisdiction:
Ordering the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U.
L. REv. 487 (1969); Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U. S. Antitrust
Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse
for Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INr'L L. 747 (1974); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure
Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
2 See, e.g., Socit Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerci-
ales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (although liability under a foreign non-dis-
closure law does not automatically excuse compliance with a valid discovery order, dis-
missal or similarly harsh sanctions should not be used when a party makes a good faith
effort to comply but is unable because of a foreign blocking statute); FTC v. Compa-
gnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (service of
subpoena by Federal Trade Commission upon French corporation invalid); In re West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (con-
tempt order overturned since defendant made a diligent effort to obtain waiver of Cana-
dian regulation precluding discovery); Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d
338 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977) (discovery orders valid even
though compliance would allegedly violate foreign nondisclosure laws); United States v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (same); In re Chase Manhattan
Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (where compliance with subpoena would violate
foreign law, subpoena was properly modified but bank must comply with its duty of
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In recent years, American courts have encountered a new dimen-
sion to the problem of obtaining foreign evidence. The difficulty arises
when litigants insist that foreign discovery can proceed only according
to the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters3 [Hague Evidence Conven-
tion]. Courts presented with this argument must address a conflict be-
tween the discovery provisions of a treaty to which the United States is
a signatory and the domestic discovery provisions and policies embodied
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar state discovery stat-
utes or rules.4 Courts in the United States have resisted interpreting the
Hague Evidence Convention as providing an exclusive mechanism for
obtaining evidence from signatory states. Instead, they have viewed the
Convention as offering discretionary procedures that an American court
ordering discovery abroad may disregard in favor of procedures author-
ized by federal or state discovery rules.
This Comment asserts that the Hague Evidence Convention was
intended to establish the sole mechanism by which evidence situated in
signatory nations may be obtained. The Comment first briefly describes
actively cooperating with the government to obtain the documents for discovery).
" The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, done March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter
cited as Hague Evidence Convention]. Actually, a defense to a discovery request assert-
ing the Hague Evidence Convention often is combined with a foreign blocking statute
defense by claiming that discovery other than through the provisions of the Hague
Evidence Convention would constitute a violation of the blocking statute. See, e.g., Con-
tinental Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Kantor v. Cycles Peugeot,
S.A., No. 81-0423, slip op. (D.R.I. April 14, 1982); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v.
Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982);
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
" Besides the different interpretation and construction problems presented by a
conflict between the Hague Evidence Convention and American discovery procedures,
there are significantly different policy considerations involved. The leading blocking
statute cases have involved important substantive policy concerns in addition to the poli-
cies favoring the availability of liberal discovery procedures. See, e.g., Soci& Internati-
onale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,
207 (1958) (enforcement of policies behind Trading with the Enemy Act following
World War II); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968)
(enforcement of United States antitrust policies); In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297
F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (enforcement of tax laws); Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal
Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Federal Maritime Board enforcement
procedures); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (shareholders' derivative
action); First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959) (investigation of
federal tax liability of Panamanian corporation with offices in New York City); In re
Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, 186 F.Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960)
(enforcement of antitrust policies). These substantive policy considerations have been
absent from the Hague Evidence Convention cases, all of which have involved litigation
between private parties with no special policy considerations. Of course, there is no
reason why such a pattern would necessarily continue.
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some of the differences between civil and common law procedures for
gathering evidence. It then outlines the key provisions of the Conven-
tion addressing those differences. The second part of the Comment ana-
lyzes American judicial interpretation of the Convention. The third
part of the Comment applies basic principles of treaty interpretation to
the Convention and concludes that the drafting nations, including the
United States, intended that the Convention establish the exclusive
means for taking evidence abroad. The Comment concludes that since
the Convention takes precedence over federal and state rules of civil
procedure, American courts may only order discovery pursuant to the
terms of the Hague Evidence Convention.
I. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
The Hague Evidence Convention was produced in 1968 at the
Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law.5 Twenty-five nations participated in negotiating and drafting the
document.6 To date, the Convention has been entered into force in sev-
enteen nations including the United States.
7
See Message from the President Transmitting to the Senate the Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil of Commercial Matters, S. EXEc. DoC. A at
III, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 1, 1972), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 323
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Message from the President]. The Hague Evidence Conven-
tion was drafted following the earlier developments of the Hague Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, done November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S.
165, reprinted in FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) [hereinafter cited as Hague Documents Conven-
tion]. The Hague Documents Convention was undertaken as a comprehensive revision
of chapter I of the Hague Civil Procedure Convention of 1954, which had superseded
the Hague Civil Procedure Convention of 1905, both of which were adopted before the
United States joined the Hague Conference on Private International Law. See Amram,
United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad,
67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 104 (1973); Note, The Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters - A Comparison with Federal
Rules Procedures, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 365, 369 n.25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Comparison with Federal Rules].
' The Convention was signed by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Northern Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland,
Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, the United States, and Yugoslavia on April
17, 1970. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, 23 U.S.T. at 2576-77.
7 Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom (including the possessions of Hong Kong, Gi-
bralter, areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the island of Cyprus, and the Faulkland
Islands), and the United States (including Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands).
7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 14, 18-19 (1984).
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A. Background
One of the primary purposes of the Convention was to fill "the
need for an effective international agreement to set up a model system
to bridge differences between the common law and civil law approaches
to the taking of evidence abroad." 8 These differences are significant.
One of the more important differences is that the technique of pretrial
discovery by private parties that has developed in the United States is
unknown in civil law countries.' This issue has infused tension into
international judicial proceedings involving American parties.1"
A second important difference is that, in civil law countries, the
taking of evidence is conducted largely by the courts. Evidence is gath-
ered for trial not by private lawyers conducting interrogatories and
depositions, but by judges who choose which witnesses to interview and
what questions to ask. After questioning the witnesses, the judge
prepares a summary record of the evidence. No verbatim transcript of
testimony is kept.1 Moreover, in the United States the gathering of
evidence for use in a lawsuit involving a foreign party is a purely pri-
vate matter so long as it does not involve compulsion or a breach of the
peace; in civil law countries an attempt by a private party to gather
evidence for use in a proceeding abroad may be an illegal usurpation of
8 Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to the President
Regarding the Evidence Convention, S. ExEc. Doc. A., at V, 92d. Cong., 2d Sess.
(Feb. 1, 1972), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 324 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Letter of Submittal].
In fact, the differences among common law countries have proven to be almost as
difficult to bridge. There have been well-publicized conflicts over American attempts to
enforce its policies abroad, especially in the antitrust area, see, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (letter of request from Amer-
ican court rejected because of potential use of evidence in criminal proceeding, which is
not a civil or commercial matter, and because of perceived threat to British sovereignty
from antitrust proceeding). There have also been disagreements between the United
States and the United Kingdom over the permissible scope of pretrial discovery. This
difference of opinion led to the inclusion of Article 23 in the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion at the United Kingdom's request. See infra note 35.
9 "Pre-trial disclosure as known in common law countries, and especially as
known in the U.S., is unheard of [in civil law countries]." PRACISING LAW INSTI-
TUTE, EXTRATERRITORIAl, DIscovERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION (1984).
10 See infra note 35.
1' See Note, Obtaining Testimony Outside the United States: Problem for the Cali-
fornia Practitioner, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1237, 1247 (1978). See generally R. SCHLES-
INGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASEs-TEsT-MATERiALS 308-21 (3d ed. 1970); Jones,
International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62
YALE L.J. 513, 527-28 (1953) (both Schlesinger and Jones are cited in Note, supra).
For descriptions of evidence-gathering in specific civil law countries, see Borel & Boyd,
Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in France for Use in Litigation
in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35, 36-37 (1979); Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence
in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention on
German-American Judicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465, 466-68 (1983).
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a "public judicial" function, and considered an affront to that nation's
"judicial sovereignty."12 Recognizing these differences, the drafters of
the Convention sought to establish a method for taking evidence that
would be both "tolerable" to the state where evidence is situated and
"utilizable" in the forum state."
While addressing these differences, participants at the Convention
also sought to replace a system of international evidence-taking based
on vague and imprecise principles of comity and reciprocity"' with a
treaty that would better serve the purpose of accomodating the different
judicial systems. Whereas United States participation in drafting the
Convention was prompted by the frustration American lawyers had
long experienced in their efforts to obtain evidence in foreign nations,15
foreign participation stemmed from a perception of excessively broad
discovery efforts by United States litigants and courts. The Hague Evi-
dence Convention, therefore, is best understood as a compromise be-
tween judicial systems with very different attitudes toward discovery
12 Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of Hague Con-
ference on Private Int'l Law, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATER ALS 785, 806 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation].
11 1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 12, at 806. For additional
details of the history of the Hague Evidence Convention, see id. at 804-08; Ainram,
The Proposed Convention'on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J. 651 (1969);
Message From the President, supra note 5.
14 See Augustine, Obtaining International Judicial Assistance Under the Fediral
Rules and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters: An Exposition of the Procedures and a Pratical Example: In re
Westinghouse Uranium Contract Litigation, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101, 122
(1980).
International comity has been defined by one court as
[t]he concept that the courts of one sovereign state should not, as a matter
of sound international relations, require acts or forebearances within the
territory, and inconsistent with the internal laws, of another sovereign
state unless a careful weighing of competing interests and alternative
means makes clear that the order is justified.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 857, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). See also Schroeder v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222, 17,223 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1983).
Perhaps the most pervasive problem of a system of international discovery relying
on unspecific concepts of comity is the lack of precise standards governing the balancing
of competing interests. Indeed, as one commentator has persuasively argued, "the bal-
ancing test [of international comity] usually allows the concern for full discovery to
dominate over all other concerns." Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic
Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 621 (1979). In supplying
specific procedures with which contracting states have agreed in advance to comply, the
Hague Evidence Convention gives concrete substance to the valuable concept of balanc-
ing competing interests. This is a clear improvement over an uncertain system based on
international comity.
1I See generally Letter of Submittal, supra note 8, at VI, 12 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS at 324; Amram, supra note 13, at 651.
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and the taking" of evidence.
B. Key Provisions
The Hague Evidence Convention establishes three basic methods
for obtaining evidence from foreign nations: letters of request,"6 use of
diplomatic or consular officials,"7 and use of designated private
commissionei-s.18
Chapter I of the Convention sets forth the procedures governing
letters of request. A letter of request seeks foreign judicial assistance in
the taking of evidence abroad. An American litigant, for example, files
a letter of request in the federal or state court (the requesting court) in
which the suit is being heard. The letter is transmitted, either through
the Department of Justice or directly to the designated "central author-
ity" in the state from which evidence is sought (the receiving state).
From this central authority, the request is forwarded to the judicial
authority in the foreign state competent to execute it. These letters of
request can be used to conduct examinations of persons, 9 address spe-
cific questions to witnesses,20 and inspect documents and personal or
real property.
21
Article 9 of the Convention provides that, normally, the receiving
state's laws and procedures will govern the execution of letters of re-
quest. The receiving state is bound, however, to comply with requests
to use a "special method or procedure" in the gathering of evidence,
unless such request is either "incompatible" with the receiving state's
internal law or "impossible of performance [under] internal practice or
procedure."2 An internal statute or procedure that is merely different
is not grounds for refusing to comply with a request for a special proce-
dure under Article 9; there must be an "absolute statutory prohibition"
or "constitutional limitation."23
16 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at chapter I.
17 Id. at chapter II.
"s Id. For more detailed descriptions of the provisions of the Convention, see Au-
gustine, supra note 14, at 120-33; Note, Comparison with Federal Rules, supra note 5,
at 374-409; see also 1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 12, at 807; Ex-
planatory Report on Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, S. EXEc. Doc. A at 11, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 1, 1972), reprinted
in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 327 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rapporteur's Report].
11 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at Article 3(e).
20 Id. at Article 3(f).
2 Id. at Article 3(g).
22 Id. at Article 9. For example, a special request might be made that an oath be
administered before a witness was questioned or that a verbatim transcript be taken.
See Note, Comparison with Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 388-89.
13 Moreover, "impossibility" rather than "impracticability" is required in order
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Article 10 provides that the receiving state's measures of compul-
sion must be applied to the same extent in executing a foreign letter of
request as in enforcing an order by its own authorities in an internal
proceeding.2 Under Article 11, a witness may assert a privilege to re-
fuse to give evidence under the law of either the state of origin or the
receiving state. 5
Article 12 provides that the receiving state may refuse to execute a
letter of request only if the request cannot be executed by the judiciary
of the receiving state (that is, if it requests an act beyond the power or
competence of the judiciary of the receiving state)26 or if the receiving
state considers that its sovereignty or security would be prejudiced by
complying with the request.2 7 Article 12 further provides that a receiv-
ing state may not refuse to execute a letter of request merely because it
claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or be-
cause its laws do not recognize the cause of action involved.
Chapter II of the Convention sets forth the procedures by which
diplomatic officers, consular agents, and designated commissioners may
take evidence in signatory nations. Depending on whether the receiving
state has made a reservation permitted by the Convention, the taking of
evidence by these officials may require prior permission from the cen-
tral authority of that state.2" A major limitation on chapter II mecha-
nisms of evidence-gathering is that compulsion against recalcitrant wit-
nesses is not generally available. Although Article 18 provides that a
state may make a declaration that foreign courts requesting evidence
may apply to the declaring state's central authority for assistance in
compelling the giving of evidence before consular agents or commission-
ers,29 only four of the seventeen nations that have signed the treaty have
made such a declaration."0 Thus, the taking of evidence by consular
agents or private commissioners under the Convention is likely to be
feasible only if the witness is willing to testify.
3 1
Chapter III of the Convention contains several general clauses that
for a receiving state to refuse a request for a special procedure under Article 9. Rap-
porteur's Report, supra note 18, at 23-24, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 333. See
also 1969 Report of the U. S. Delegation, supra note 12, at 810-11.
2" Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at Article 10.
25 Id. at Article 11.
2" Id. at Article 12(a).
27 Id. at Article 12(b).
28 Id. at Articles 15-17.
" Id. at Article 18.
so Czechoslovokia, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States have made
such a declaration. 7 MARTINDALE-HuBBELL LAW DIREcToRY, pt. 7, at 14-20
(1984).
Si See Note, Comparison with Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 379.
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apply to the Convention as a whole. A key provision of chapter III is
Article 32, which provides that "the present Convention shall not dero-
gate from [treaties] containing provisions on the matters covered by this
Convention to which the Contracting States are, or shall become Par-
ties." 2 The effect of Article 32 is to permit the taking of evidence
abroad under mechanisms established by other treaties to which the
signatories of the Hague Evidence Convention have agreed.
Courts and commentators have focused particular attention on Ar-
ticles 23"8 and 27"' as support for an interpretation that the Convention
establishes discretionary mechanisms for foreign discovery. Article 23
provides that "[a] Contracting State may . . declare that it will not
execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial
discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries." 5 Ac-
2 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at Article 32.
33 Id. at Article 23; see Lasky v. Continental Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227,
1229 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide
to Securing Disclosure From Non-resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT'L
LAw. 61, 67-69 (1983); see also Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp.,
No. 82-5500, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1983).
-1 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at Article 27; see Lasky v. Conti-
nental Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Piersburg GmbH &
Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 244, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d
840, 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 886 (Cal Ct. App. 1981); Batista, supra note 33, at 79.
" Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at Article 23.
At least one American court has pointed to the existence of an Article 23 declara-
tion and decided that the Convention cannot provide the only means for obtaining for-
eign evidence. In Lasky v. Continental Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa.
1983), the court discussed West Germany's Article 23 reservation, see id. at 1229
("[Germany] will not execute letters of request for the purpose of obtaining pretrial
discovery of documents"), and stated that limiting discovery solely to the procedures
established by the Convention "would severely restrict the plaintiffs' scope of discov-
ery," id.
Other considerations, however, contributed to this conclusion. West Germany has
not made an Article 18 declaration that it would provide assistance in compelling wit-
nesses to give evidence before consular agents or private commissioners. In fact, West
Germany has made an Article 33 declaration that prohibits the taking of evidence from
German nationals by consular agents or private commissioners. 7 MARTINDALE-HUB-
BELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 16 (1984). Obtaining pretrial discovery of documents
in West Germany pursuant to the terms of the Convention, therefore, is a difficult
matter. Pretrial discovery from West Germany in any other manner, however, is likely
to be just as difficult.
Article 23 reservations are not generally so troubling. Of the 17 signatory nations,
five (Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Israel, and the United States) have made no
Article 23 declarations blocking pretrial discovery of documents. Seven other nations
(Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom)
have adopted limited Article 23 declarations patterned after the British reservation. Id.
at 14-20. The British declaration provides that the United Kingdom will not execute
letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents but
is restricted so as to apply only to letters of request that require a person
a. to state what documents are relevant to the proceedings to which the
[Vol. 132:1461
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cording to Article 27, the other clauses of the Convention do not pro-
hibit participating nations from "(b) permitting, by internal law or
practice, any act provided for in this Convention to be performed under
less restrictive conditions" and "(c) permitting, by internal law or prac-
tice, methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in this
Convention." 6 Article 27 clearly permits a state in which evidence is
situated to allow the gathering of evidence under its less restrictive
practices. There is some disagreement, however, about whether Article
27 confers discretion upon a state seeking evidence to order discovery in
a manner not specified in the Convention.
3 7
The language of the Hague Evidence Convention does not dearly
indicate whether the Convention was intended to establish exclusive
procedures by which a court seeking foreign evidence can order discov-
ery abroad. Because the Convention itself is not clear on this issue and
Letter of Request relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody,
or power; or
b. to produce any documents other than particular documents specified
in the Letter of Request as being documents appearing to the re-
quested court to be, or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody, or
powers.
Id. at 18. Such restricted Article 23 declarations are designed only to prevent non-
specific fishing expeditions for evidence; they do not bar pretrial requests for production
of specific documents. See REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SPEcIAL COMMISSION ON
THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION OF 18 MARcH 1970 ON THE TAKING OF Evi-
DENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR CoMMERCIAL MATTERS, June 12-15, 1978, reprinted in
17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1425, 1427-28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL
COMMISSION REPORT]; see also OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, DEPARTmENr OF
STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INT'L LAW 873-75 (1978) [herein-
after cited as DIGEST].
The remaining five nations (France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Por-
tugal) have adopted Article 23 declarations that appear to preclude pretrial discovery of
all documents, regardless of whether the request is for specific documents or not. 7
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7, 14-20 (1984). Some of these coun-
tries, however, may decide to adopt limited Article 23 declarations. In 1978, the Special
Commission met at the Hague to review the operation of the convention and concluded
that many civil law countries had made Article 23 declarations because of a misunder-
standing that "pretrial discovery" referred to "some sort of proceeding permitted under
American law prior to the institution of a lawsuit." DIGEST, supra, at 873. See also
SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 1427-28. The members of the Special Com-
mission recommended that contracting nations either make no Article 23 declaration or
restrict its application along British lines so that it prohibited only fishing for nonspe-
cific evidence. Id; see also Digest supra, at 875.
West Germany and France, however, appear to have rejected the Special Commis-
sion's recommendation. These two countries are currently enforcing Article 23 in such
a manner as to preclude pretrial discovery of almost all documents, regardless of
whether the request is for specific evidence. See Batista, supra note 33, at 65-69 (dis-
cussing French interpretation of Article 23); Shemanski, supra note 11, at 480-83 (dis-
cussing West German application of its Article 23 declaration).
3' Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at Article 27.
37,See infra text accompanying notes 69-76.
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because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do provide specific mech-
anisms for obtaining foreign evidence, 8 Americans courts have viewed
the procedures specified by the Hague Evidence Convention as
discretionary.
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE HAGUE EVIDENCE
CONVENTION
Although the Hague Evidence Convention has been in force in the
United States for over a decade now, few reported cases assess the ap-
plicability of its provisions to discovery abroad. One reason for the
dearth of case law is that in the first few years after the United States
ratified the treaty in 1972, only a handful of other nations also adopted
it. 9 Moreover, American courts and litigants, unfamiliar with the pro-
visions of the Convention and perhaps apprehensive as to the scope of
discovery available under its terms, have tended to resort to discovery
procedures authorized by federal or state rules of civil procedure.
A. State Court Decisions
State courts have almost uniformly interpreted the Hague Evi-
dence Convention as providing discretionary mechanisms by which evi-
dence situated in foreign state may be obtained. Volkswagenwerk Ak-
tiengesellschaft v. Superior Court4" and Piergury GmbH & Co. KG v.
Superior Court42 are examples of state cases in which defendants have
1 Pursuant to Rule 33, for example, a party can serve written interrogatories
directly on another party located in a foreign country without judicial intervention.
Under the Hague Evidence Convention, by contrast, a party would be required to ask
the forum court to request assistance to obtain evidence from the designated authorities
in the foreign country through a letter of request under Article 1. The party could also
specify the questions it wanted answered under Article 3, thus accomplishing the same
result but probably with more delay and possibly with more cost. For a detailed discus-
sion of the costs of discovery under the Hague Evidence Convention, see Note, Compar-
ison with Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 396-97.
" By 1980, only seven countries had ratified the Convention. See Augustine,
supra note 14, at 121 n.104.
40 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, other state court decisions regard-
ing the application of the Hague Evidence Convention include Van Dongen v. Arburg
Maschinenfabrik Hehl & Sohne GmbH & Co., KG, No. L-71021-81 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. July 1, 1983) (protective order granted requiring parties first to comply with
Hague Evidence Convention); McKenna v. Fiat Societa per Azioni, No. 81-2676 (Pa.
Ct. of C.P. July 20, 1983) (protective order to comply with Hague Evidence Conven-
tion denied). But see Gilbert v. Josef Timmer Mfg. Co., No. CV 81-2340 (Ala. Cir.
Ct. July 5, 1983) (protective order granted requiring that discovery proceed only in
compliance with the Hague Evidence Convention).
41 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
4 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
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protested that certain discovery orders, requiring the gathering of evi-
dence in West Germany pursuant to California discovery rules, failed
to comply with the Hague Evidence Convention. In Volkswagenwerk, a
California appeals court held that the Convention merely provides an
"alternative means of obtaining evidence from within West Germany"
and that the nations ratifying the Convention had not intended to create
a "preemptive and exclusive rule of international evidence-gathering." 4 s
From its reading of Article 27, the court concluded that the Con-
vention did not establish "a fixed rule but rather a minimum measure
of international cooperation."" The court reasoned that principles of
international comity dictate that the procedures established by the Con-
vention were the "obvious and preferable" means for obtaining foreign
evidence.45 The court thus held that the party seeking discovery must
initially comply with the provisions of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion.4" The court stressed, however, that requiring preliminary compli-
ance with the Convention was an exercise of "judicial self-restraint"
and that a California court had power to order discovery against a for-
eign party over which it had personal jurisdiction even though the dis-
covery procedure was not specified in the Hague Evidence
Convention.' 7
Much of the same result was reached in Pierburg by a different
California appeals panel. In that case a West German defendant who
had been served written interrogatories by an American plaintiff ob-
jected that the interrogatories failed to conform to the terms of the
Hague Evidence Convention. Agreeing with the conclusion of the
Volkswagenwerk court, the court held that a state court "should require
litigants seeking. . . discovery to first attempt to comply with the Con-
vention before allowing the litigant to disregard it."48
B. Federal Court Decisions
The first reported decision resolving a conflict between the Hague
Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
Lasky v. Continental Products Corp.49 In Lasky a German defendant
43 Volkswagenwerk, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 858-59, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
"Id. at 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 886. Such an interpretation of Article 27, how-
ever, is misguided. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
45 Id. at 858, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
46 Id. at 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
47 Id. at 860, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
4 Piersburg, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 240, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
49 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Two earlier federal court cases had re-
ferred to the Hague Evidence Convention in addressing motions to dismiss actions on
forum non conveniens grounds. In Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775
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sought a protective order against interrogatories and a request for the
production of documents served by the plaintiff. The court held that
there was no conflict between the Convention and the Federal Rules
because it interpreted the Convention as "permissive and not
mandatory. ' 50 The court reached this conclusion by interpreting Article
27 of the Convention as permitting a signatory nation not only to allow
more liberal discovery within its own borders, but also to order discov-
ery broader than that allowed by the Convention in other contracting
states.51
Two other federal cases, both decided in 1983, reach different con-
clusions from that in Lasky, although neither goes so far as to hold that
the Hague Evidence Convention provides the exclusive means of pro-
curing evidence located in other contracting states. In Schroeder v. Luf-
thansa German Airlines,52 a federal district court relied heavily on the
reasoning of the California courts in Volkswagenwerk and Piersburg to
hold that the "Hague Convention... provides an obvious and prefera-
ble means of obtaining evidence [located abroad]."5 3 The court ordered
(D.C. Cir. 1980), the court affirmed the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion to
dismiss a products liability action after the defendant had conceded liability because all
the evidence relevant to the defense and extent of damages was located abroad. The
court noted that the Hague Evidence Convention was available to help the parties gain
access to these materials but concluded that "these mechanisms . . . are far from per-
fect." Id. at 788. The court cited "numerous exceptions" to the availability of discovery
under the Convention that could potentially limit the parties' access to information
necessary to a full and fair trial of damages issues, thus necessitating the dismissal of
the action. Id. at 788-90.
It is significant that in Pain the documents and other tangible evidence that were
located abroad and that were necessary to a resolution of the question of damages were
in the possession and under the control of a Norwegian corporation, which the court
found to be beyond the personal jurisdiction of the court. The court emphasized the fact
that the defendant's ability to prove affirmative defenses depended on evidence located
in Norway that was "immune from the compulsory process of American courts." Id. at
787. There is at least an implication that the court might have reached a different
conclusion had the documents been located abroad but under the control of a party to
the action over whom the court had personal jurisdiction. This further implies that the
court would have felt justified in ignoring or waiving the applicability of the Hague
Evidence Convention under such circumstances.
In Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., 528 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Va. 1981), anotherforum
non conveniens case, the court discussed the Hague Evidence Convention briefly, not-
ing that it was a "less than perfect" system that would not "completely replicate the
access to evidence which would exist if all relevant material were located in this coun-
try." Id. at 820. In refusing to dismiss the action as inconvenient, however, the court
concluded that similar problems would exist were the situation reversed and that the
Hague Evidence Convention provided the parties with "reasonable procedures by
which to obtain evidence present in a foreign forum." Id.
50 Lasky, 569 F. Supp. at 1228.
"' Id. As in the state court decisions, see supra text accompanying note 44, this
reasoning misinterprets Article 27. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
" 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1983).
53 Id. at 17,223 (emphasis added).
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the plaintiff to proceed with discovery in compliance with the Hague
Evidence Convention," but it refused to rule whether "the Convention
is a preemptive and exhaustive rule of evidence gathering. .... ,,55 The
court disposed of the motion before it for a protective order by holding
that the plaintiff's initial discovery requests, at least, must comply with
the Hague Evidence Convention.56
A different federal district court concluded, in Philadelphia Gear
Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp.,57 that "the proper exercise of judi-
cial restraint requires that the avenue of first resort for plaintiff be the
Hague Convention."58 In so ruling that the plaintiff's "first attempt" to
obtain evidence abroad must comply with the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion rather than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ex-
pressly disagreed with the decision reached in Lasky, and particularly
with that court's construction of Article 27 of the Convention.5 9 The
court in Philadelphia Gear construed Article 27 "in light of the under-
lying policies" of Convention6" and concluded that "it permits only the
country in which the evidence is being sought to supplement unilater-
ally the convention procedures with its internal rules."6
The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case involving a conflict
between the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of
54 Plaintiff was ordered to "draft for this Court's entry, a Letter of Request pur-
suant to the Convention." Id. at 17,224.
5 Id. at 17,224 n.1. The Court gave some clue to its sentiments on the issue by
using the term "postures" to describe the defendant's position that the Convention
should be construed as the exclusive discovery method. See id.
56 Id. at 17,244.
5 No. 82-5500 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1983) (motion to compel answers to interroga-
tories and production of documents denied).
58 Id. slip op. at 5-6 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 5 n.3; see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
60 Id. at 4. The underlying policies of the Convention, according to the court, are
uniformity of procedure in obtaining evidence in foreign countries and reconciliation of
"markedly different discovery procedures that exist in common law countries, such as
the United States, and civil law countries, such as West Germany." Id. at 2. See also
id. at 4 n.2.
61 Id. at 4. There have also been some unreported decisions resolving conflicts
between the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l. Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, S.P.A. &
SNFA, No. 81-3984 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1983) (plaintiff ordered to proceed with dis-
covery by letters in compliance with Hague Evidence Convention); Kantor v. Cycles
Peuqeot, S.A., No. 81-0423, slip op. at 5 n.7 (D.R.I. Apr. 14, 1982) (despite recogni-
tion by court of potential increase in cost and burden, plaintiff ordered to pursue dis-
covery in conformance with Convention procedures, with reservation by court of power
to order additional discovery should plaintiff be unable to obtain all information
sought); McKenna v. Fiat Societa per Azioni, No. 81-2676, slip op. at 4 (Pa. Ct. of
C.P. July 20, 1983) (defendant's motion for protective order denied and plaintiff's mo-
tion to compel answers to interrogatories granted because Hague Evidence Convention
"is not controlling in the instant case").
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Civil Procedure. There is, however, some indication of how at least two
members of the Court would react if presented with such a problem. In
Volkswagenwerk A. G. v. Falzon,6" Justice O'Connor, acting as a Cir-
cuit Justice, granted a stay of a state court order permitting plaintiffs to
attempt to take depositions of German citizens in Germany over the
defendant's objections that such action would violate the Hague Evi-
dence Convention."6 In an earlier proceeding in the same case, Chief
Justice Burger had granted a stay pending disposition of Volkswagen-
werk's application for leave to appeal the discovery order before the
Supreme Court of Michigan."
Justice O'Connor reasoned that Chief Justice Burger "must have
concluded that there was a substantial chance that four Justices would
agree to consider the case on the merits, that there was a significant
chance that the applicant would prevail, and that the injury resulting
from the denial of a stay would be irreparable."65
Since the question on the merits had not changed, Justice
62 103 S. Ct. 1810 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice 1983).
63 Id. at 1810. Justice O'Connor's decision outlined the rather complicated proce-
dural history of this case. The discovery order had been entered by a Michigan trial
court in the case of Falzon v. Volkswagen of Am., No. 78-803-043 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Wayne County Oct. 7, 1980). The trial court denied Volkswagenwerk's motion to pre-
vent depositions except in accordance with the Hague Evidence Convention, and the
Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Volkswagenwerk then sought re-
view in the Michigan Supreme Court, but the trial court in the meantime ordered that
the depositions take place before the Michigan Supreme Court could review the appeal.
When plaintiffs filed notice to take the depositions, Volkswagenwerk applied to the
Supreme Court of Michigan for an emergency stay and for immediate consideration of
the order. When the state court did not act, Volkswagenwerk sought a stay from the
United States Supreme Court, which Chief Justice Burger granted in Volkswagenwerk
A.G. v. Falzon, No. A-191 (Burger, Circuit Justice, order of Aug. 23, 1982), pending
final disposition of the appeal before the Supreme Court of Michigan. The Chief Jus-
tice also later denied plaintiffs' motion to vacate the stay. See Volkswagenwerk A.G. v.
Falzon, No. A-191 (Burger, Circuit Justice, order of Sept. 2, 1982).
The Supreme Court of Michigan then denied the application for leave to appeal
the trial court's original discovery order. See Falzon v. Volkswagen Mfg. Corp. of Am.
Nos. 69595 & 69596 (Mich. Feb. 22, 1983). The stay entered by Chief Justice Burger
then expired by its own terms. Volkswagenwerk appealed the Supreme Court of Mich-
igan's decision denying the application for leave to appeal the trial court's discovery
order to the United States Supreme Court and also petitioned the Supreme Court of
Michigan for a stay of the depositions pending disposition of its appeal. When the state
supreme court again did not act, Volkswagenwerk applied to the United States Su-
preme Court for a stay pending disposition of its appeal. This application was granted
by Justice O'Connor. 103 S. Ct. 1810 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice 1983). Volkswagen-
werk's appeal from the Supreme Court of Michigan had been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon, 52 U.S.L.W. 3609
(U.S. Feb. 21, 1984).
Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, No. A-191 (Burger, Circuit Justice, order of
Aug. 23, 1982); see supra note 63.
05 Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, 103 S. Ct. 1810, 1811 (O'Connor, Circuit
Justice 1983) (emphasis added).
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O'Connor concluded that this decision that a stay was appropriate was
"the law of the case."66 O'Connor, therefore, granted the stay pending
disposition of the application for a stay before the Supreme Court of
Michigan.
6 7
The implication from Justice O'Connor's order is that Chief Jus-
tice Burger believed that at least four other members of the Court
would join him in ruling on the merits that the Hague Evidence Con-
vention must be complied with in seeking discovery of a foreign na-
tional. These orders, however, leave unclear whether the Chief Justice
or Justice O'Connor would construe the Hague Evidence Convention
as establishing the exclusive means of discovery in other contracting
states or merely as a mandatory initial procedure.
III. PRINCIPLES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
Although American court opinions have interpreted the Hague
Evidence Convention as providing, at best, a suggested mode for taking
foreign evidence, the Convention was actually intended to provide an
exclusive mechanism by which foreign evidence may be obtained.
While the language of the document is ambiguous on this point, princi-
ples of treaty interpretation, as well as American constitutional doctrine
on the role of ratified treaties vis-a-vis existing statutes, mandate an
exclusive reading of the Convention.
A. The Hague Evidence Convention Was Meant to be Exclusive
The Supreme Court has held that "when the meaning of a treaty
is not clear, recourse may be had to the negotiations, preparatory
works, and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties to es-
tablish its meaning."6" There is no clear-cut negotiating history com-
pelling an exclusive reading of the Hague Evidence Convention. There
is, however, documentation offering some guidance for interpreting Ar-
ticle 27 of the Convention-an Article crucial to the determination of
this issue.6 9
Article 27 provides that
66 Id.
67 See supra note 63.
" Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1934). Similarly, both the Second
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, RESTATEmEW (SEc-
OND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 147(c)(1), (d) (1965),
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 at Article 32, provide that courts
may resort to the negotiating history in interpreting a treaty.
69 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46, 51 & 59-61.
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The provisions of the present Convention shall not pre-
vent a Contracting State from-
(b) permitting, by its internal law or practice, any act
provided for in this Convention to be preformed under less
restrictive conditions;
(c) permitting, by its internal law or practice, methods
of taking evidence other than those provided for in this
Convention."0
Some American courts have interpreted this article as applying
both to states seeking foreign evidence and to states in which such evi-
dence is located."1 This interpretation of Article 27 has provided a fun-
damental rationale for a permissive construction of the treaty, whereby
procedures specified by the Convention may be disregarded in favor of
more liberal American discovery rules. It is apparent, however, that the
drafters of the Convention intended a narrower construction of the Ar-
ticle. While Article 27 was intended to give states in which evidence is
situated discretion to permit broader discovery within their borders, it
was not intended to give states seeking foreign evidence the power to
order broader discovery. Since broader discovery is not authorized, the
Convention sets forth the only means by which foreign evidence may be
obtained.
Philip Amram, the official Rapporteur of the Hague Evidence
Convention and co-chairman of the drafting committee described Arti-
cle 27(b)'s scope, in his Rapporteur's Report, as applying only to the
"State of execution. 72 Later in the Report, in discussing the impor-
tance of Article 27, Amram indicated that the Article was "designed to
preserve existing internal law and practice in a Contracting State
which provides broader, more generous and less restrictive rules of in-
ternational cooperation in the taking of evidence for the benefit of for-
eign courts and litigants.1
73
Amram's interpretation of Article 27(b) would permit the state of
execution to allow foreign consuls and commissioners broader use of
compulsion against a witness within its borders than is generally al-
70 Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, at Article 27.
71 See, e.g., Lasky v. Continental Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (see "supra text accompanying notes 49-51); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (see
supra text accompanying notes 41-47).
72 See Rapporteur's Report, supra note 18, at 39-40, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATRI-
ALS at 339.
78 Id. at 341.
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lowed under Article 18. Amram's interpretation does not, however, ex-
tend to the state requesting discovery the same power or the use of
compulsion against a witness." The implication to be drawn from such
a reading of Article 27 is that the Convention purports to set forth the
sole procedures by which foreign evidence may be obtained.
Also in his Report, Amram identified a limitation on other meth-
ods of taking evidence that supports a restricted reading of Article 27.
These methods-acceptable under, though not explicitly authorized by,
Article 27-include traveling to the foreign country to take a deposition
of a willing witness, briefing local counsel in the foreign country to
examine a witness, and conducting an inspection of property located in
the foreign country with an expert. "The only conditions are that the
State of execution will permit this . . . .
Amram gave basically the same message to a Plenary Session of
the Hague Conference, held October 25-26, 1968, when he reported on
the work of the Committee that had drafted the text of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention:
Mr. Amram emphasized that. . . the Convention provided
for a degree of flexibility wider than most of the Conventions
established by the Conference. Thus any State which became
a Party to the Convention had complete freedom to offer
unilaterally to any other State, with or without reciprocity,
any judicial assistance wider than the minimum presented in
the Convention. This, the United States, for example, did
and would continue to do, under its internal law and
procedures.
7 6
The inference to be drawn from the Rapporteur's interpretations of
Article 27 and the Convention as a whole is that the Convention estab-
74 Id. at 339.
" Id. at 342. Amram also gave an example of courts in New York and Chicago
appointing German and Italian judges as commissioners and granting them compulsion
against German and Italian witnesses respectively to allow them to examine these wit-
nesses in New York and Chicago in their own language and without interference from
the local courts:
If the internal law and practice of a particular State offers these broad
privileges to foreign courts and litigants, which go beyond anything pro-
vided for in the Convention, that State may safely sign and ratify the Con-
vention without thereby affecting its right to continue to offer these extra
benefits to foreign courts and litigants.
Id. (emphasis added).
76 Conference de La Haya de Droit Internationale Priv6, IV Actes et Documents
de la Onzi~me Session 189 (1970). The draft of the Hague Evidence Convention was
approved at the Plenary Session with 21 delegations voting to accept and one (Yugosla-
via) abstaining. Id.
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lishes flexible, but exclusive, mechanisms for taking foreign evidence.
Another principle of treaty interpretation asserts that United
States courts assessing the domestic implications of the Hague Evidence
Convention should examine the meaning American negotiators and en-
forcers have attributed to the treaty."" Since Phillip Amram was the
United States representative to the committee that drafted the treaty,
78
his interpretation of Article 27 should be of special significance to
American courts. This is particularly so in that his report was favora-
bly considered throughout the ratification process."9
American courts should also consider the report of the United
States delegation to the Convention 0 and the Secretary of State's Letter
of Submittal to the Senate81 when deciding the intended scope of the
Convention. Both documents contend that the Convention establishes
"minimum standards"' 8 2 to which signatory states will adhere. At least
one court has misinterpreted the minimum standards language and con-
cluded that the mechanisms established by the treaty are the minimum
procedures that all receiving states have agreed to execute.8 In both
documents, however, the references to minimum standards are immedi-
ately followed by the assertion that "[a] country may unilaterally offer
by internal law and practice, wider, broader, more liberal and less re-
7' The Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hile courts interpret treaties for them-
selves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight." Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
The Second Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States elabo-
rates that "[i]n determining the effect of [a treaty] as domestic law," a court may take
into account "domestic sources in the formation of an international agreement" such as
"[c]ommittee reports, debates, and any other indications of the meaning that the legisla-
tive branch has attached to an international agreement in cases where the agreement, as
a matter of internal law, requires the assent of the Senate or Congress." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 151, com-
ment (b)(i) (1965). In addition, the Restatement provides that a court may take into
account other domestic sources such as "[a]spects of the history of the negotiations...
including unilateral statements of understanding . . . and, probably, internal official
correspondence and position papers prepared for the use of the United States delegation
to the negotiation." Id. at § 151 comment (b)(ii).
78 See 1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 12, at 805.
'9 When recommending the Hague Evidence Convention to the Senate, President
Nixon attached the Rapporteur's Report to his Letter of Transmittal. See Message
from the President, supra note 5. Also, the Report was mentioned in the report of the
Foreign Relations Committee, which recommended that the Senate ratify the treaty.
U.S. CONG. EXEC. REP. No 25, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972).
80 1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 12.
81 Letter of Submittal, supra note 8.
82 1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 12, at 808; Letter of Submittal,
supra note 8, at VI, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 324.
83 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840,
869, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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strictive international assistance.""&4 Taken in context, therefore, the ref-
erences in the Delegation Report and Letter of Submittal to minimum
standards mean only that a receiving state may offer greater assistance
in taking evidence, not that a requesting state can order more than
what is set forth by the Convention. 5
American courts construing the Convention must also give "great
weight" 8 to the positions of the Department of State' and the Justice
Department 8 toward the treaty. In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Falzon, 89 those positions were made clear. In that case, the Depart-
ment of State refused to transmit a discovery order issued by a Michi-
gan court requiring American consular officials to carry out depositions
in West Germany on the grounds that the depositions were contrary to
the Hague Evidence Convention.9" Both the Department of State and
the Department of Justice indicated that they viewed the Convention
1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 12, at 808.
In the Secretary of State's Letter of Submittal, the reference to the Convention as a
set of minimum standards is immediately followed by the statement that "through arti-
cles 27, 28, and 32, [the Convention] provides a flexible framework within which any
future liberalizing changes in policy and tradition in any country with respect to inter-
national judicial cooperation may be translated into effective change in international
procedures." Letter of Submittal, supra note 8, at VI, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at
324. In light of this subsequent assertion regarding Articles 27, 28, and 32, the Secre-
tary's reference to the Convention as a minimum standard appears not to suggest that a
requesting court can order discovery by procedures other than those recognized by the
Convention, but rather that evidence can be gathered outside the Convention only
under the less restrictive procedures specifically authorized by Articles 27, 28, and 32.
See infra text accompanying note 97 (discussing expressio unius principle of treaty
interpretation).
85 The reference to the Convention as a minimum standard was designed to reas-
sure American lawmakers that "the free and open system of assistance, available in the
United States under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781 and 1782 and § 3.02 of the Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act, remains unchanged and unrestricted." 1969 Report
of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 12, at 808.
"B See supra note 77.
87 The Department of State was the agency responsible for negotiating the treaty
and is one of the two agencies charged with its enforcement. See Amram, supra note 5,
at 104; Amram, supra note 13, at 651-52. It necessarily is the agency that executes the
taking of evidence in foreign countries by United States diplomatic officers and consular
agents under chapter II of the Convention. Furthermore, the State Department plays a
role under Article 36 of the Convention, which provides that "any difficulties which
may arise between Contracting States in connection with the operation of this Conven-
tion shall be settled through diplomatic channels." Hague Evidence Convention, supra
note 3, at Article 36.
88 The Department of Justice also helps to enforce the treaty. The Department
has been designated as the "Central Authority" that receives letters of request from
abroad and forwards them to the executing courts. See Hague Evidence Convention,
supra note 3, at Article 32.
89 103 S. Ct. 1810 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice 1983).
8 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, 11, Volkswagenwerk Ak-
tiengesellschaft v. Falzon, 103 S. Ct. 1810 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice 1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Brief for the United States].
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and the procedures for taking evidence established by a bilateral ex-
change of diplomatic notes9" between the United States and West Ger-
man governments pursuant to Article 32 of the Convention as the ex-
clusive means by which an American court could order discovery in
West Germany.
92
Another principle of treaty interpretation provides that where the
language of the agreement is ambiguous, courts may refer to the subse-
quent practice of the contracting states in order to determine the
treaty's meaning.93 As we have seen, the subsequent practice of the
United States government is to treat the Convention as exclusive. Like-
wise, the practice of the West German government has been to view the
Convention as exclusive. During the proceedings in Falzon, the West
German Ambassador in Washington, D.C., sent a letter to the Chief
Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, protesting that the Michigan
discovery order violated the Convention. The ambassador wrote,
The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are
parties to the Hague [Evidence] Convention [that] establishes
. . . the legal framework and procedures for the taking of
evidence in Germany for use in civil matters pending in the
United States. The Convention sets forth the only procedures
91 The text of these diplomatic notes, which reaffirmed that a bilateral exchange
of notes in 1955 and 1956 between West Germany and the United States is still in
effect after the ratification of the Convention, may be found in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCi-
ATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACTICAL AP-
PROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND ACCOMMODATIONS 1271-81 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION]. For a discussion of these Diplomatic Notes, see
Shemanski, supra note 11, at 477-78.
92 See Brief for the United States, supra note 90, at 6, 11. James Hergen, an
assistant legal advisor for consular affairs at the Department of State, helped attorneys
from the Department of Justice prepare the United States's amicus brief. See id. at
cover page.
93 "In ascertaining the meaning of a treaty we may look... to [the parties'] own
practical construction of it." Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933).
This principle has been adopted by both the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 147(1)(f) (1965), and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(b), reprinted in 8 INT'L LE-
GAL MATERIALS 679, 692. One commentator has noted that
[t]he [Vienna Convention] entered into force upon ratification by the
thirty-fifth state in 1980. Although over half of the signatory states, in-
cluding the United States, have yet formally to ratify the convention, it is
generally accepted that the convention is "already recognized as the au-
thoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." United States Presi-
dent, Message from the President Transmitting the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties to Congress, S. EXEC. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1971).
Koh, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reflects
World Vision, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71, 95 n.88 (1982).
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sanctioned by the German government for the taking of such
evidence.94
As with the German government, it appears that the subsequent
practice of the French government has been to view the Convention as
exclusive. Angered by the fact that "the terms of the Hague [Evidence]
Convention ... were frequently disregarded by American litigants,"95
the French Senate and National Assembly in 1980 enacted a statute
that makes it a criminal offense to request or attempt to solicit evidence
of a commercial or technical nature for use in a foreign proceeding in a
manner not provided for by the Hague Evidence Convention or other
international treaties. 96
While an exclusive interpretation of the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion is compelled by the intentions of the drafters and subsequent prac-
tices of the signatory states, several other principles warranting this
construction should be noted. The doctrine expressio unius est exclusio
alterius asserts that if numerous exceptions to a treaty are specifically
set forth, the treaty is intended to exclude other exceptions. The Hague
Evidence Convention provides several exceptions to the chapter I and II
modes of obtaining evidence: evidence may be taken under other bilat-
eral treaties pursuant to Article 32; the executing state may permit less
restrictive discovery pursuant to Article 27; and a variety of limiting
declarations are provided for in chapters I and JJ.97 The conclusion to
be drawn is that since the drafters did not provide an exception for
requesting courts to order foreign discovery on their own terms, such
discovery may not be ordered.
An exclusive construction of the Convention is also compelled
when the contractual nature of the treaty is examined. The Supreme
" Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix at 8-9, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-
schaft v. Falzon, 103 S. Ct. 1810 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice 1983) (emphasis added).
See also Brief for the United States, supra note 90, app. at 3a (letter from West Ger-
man embassy in Washington to the Department of State, requesting the Department of
State to help prevent execution of the Michigan discovery orders in Falzon and noting
that "[ilt is particularly distressing that such attempt to take depositions in the Federal
Republic of Germany is [sic] not been made in accordance with procedures of the
Hague [Evidence] Convention ... to which both the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany are parties").
" Herzog, The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 382, 382 (1981).
" See id. at 382-85; see also TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 91, at
1329; Batista, supra note 33, at 64-65, 67-69.
97 See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3. Of the 22 articles in chapters I
and II, seven (Articles 2, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, and 18) permit a contracting state to make
declarations that expand or restrict procedures authorized by the Convention. In addi-
tion, Article 33 provides that a contracting state may make a reservation under which it
refuses to recognize any of the chapter II mechanisms of gathering evidence.
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Court has held that treaty "obligations should be... construed so as to
effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reci-
procity between them."98 Since, in a sense, "treaties are contracts be-
tween independent nations," '9 it is reasonable to interpret the Conven-
tion in light of the contracting states' justified expectations. Civil law
countries made several large concessions in the Hague Evidence Con-
vention. Among the most important is Article 9, which "impose[s] obli-
gations on civil law courts to take evidence 'common-law style,' a
method with which they are not familiar."' 00 Considering that civil law
countries even before the Convention enjoyed generous assistance in
taking evidence within the United States under federal law,' 01 they
would have had little incentive for agreeing to these "common-law
style" innovations unless the convention was intended to define and
limit the scope of procedures by which common law countries would
order discovery within civil law countries. A contractual analysis of the
treaty, therefore, supports an exclusive reading of the Convention.
Finally, it makes little sense to interpret the terms of a treaty so as
to render the treaty superfluous. If the Convention is construed to es-
tablish no more than preliminary guidelines for obtaining foreign evi-
dence, courts could supplant or supplement it at the insistence of one of
the parties that the discovery attempted under the Convention was "un-
successful. "1 2 Such an interpretation would mean that the Hague Evi-
9 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933).
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931). Note the repeated references to
the "contracting" nations in the Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3. But see
McNArR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 739, 743-44 (1961), cited in RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 146 Reporters' Note
(1) (1965). McNair argues that interpreting a treaty as a contract (Vertrag) may be
appropriate when the treaty is a bilateral agreement, but that that such an approach to
interpretation is inappropriate for multilateral treaties. A multilateral treaty, in Mc-
Nair's view, more closely resembles an act of a legislature for the common good.
100 Amram, supra note 5, at 106. Other major concessions by civil law countries
include the chapter II provisions of the Convention. Although civil law countries view
the gathering of evidence as a judicial function, see supra text accompanying notes 11
& 12, chapter II provisions increase the powers of consuls to take evidence outside of
court and introduce "into the civil law world on a limited basis the concept of taking of
evidence by [private] commissioners." Amram, supra note 5, at 105. See also Rap-
porteur's Report, supra note 18, at 11, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 327.
101 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781, 1782 (1982) (the latest amendments to these laws were
enacted on October 3, 1964-several years before the drafting of the Hague Evidence
Convention).
102 See supra text accompanying notes 40-48 & 52-61. Every court that has thus
far entered a written order requiring compliance with the Hague Evidence Convention
has indicated that it would consider a motion to compel additional discovery outside of
the provisions of the Convention if it appeared that the initial discovery were insuffi-
cient. No court has yet decided such a motion.
Since 12 of the 17 signatory nations have adopted some form of Article 23 reserva-
tion against executing letters of request seeking pretrial discovery, see supra note 35, it
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dence Convention could be easily challenged every time it is invoked,
eventually rendering even its initial application an empty exercise.
B. The Hague Evidence Convention Supersedes Federal and State
Rules of Civil Procedure
While principles of treaty interpretation compel an exclusive read-
ing of the Hague Evidence Convention, constitutional doctrine dictates
that the provisions of the Convention override federal and state °10
mechanisms for obtaining evidence situated in foreign states. The
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution places treaties on
an equal footing with statutes.10 4 The Supreme Court has held that
[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing,
that is, require no legislation to make them operative, to that
extent they have the force and effect of a legislative enact-
ment .... By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legisla-
tion. Both are declared by [the supremacy clause] to be the
supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to
either over the other.
10 5
Whether a treaty is self-executing depends on whether it requires
affirmative legislative action to make its provisions operative. In United
States v. Enger,10 a federal district court ruled on whether the Vienna
Convention, a treaty concerning the scope of diplomatic immunity rec-
ognized in the United States, was self-executing. The presence of the
treaty's detailed provisions and the absence of language requiring con-
gressional implementation legislation led the court to rule that the
treaty was self-executing and that, "upon entry into force, it at once
is likely that many attempts at discovery under the terms of the Convention could be
deemed "unsuccessful."
103 Under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, a treaty ratified by the
United States prevails over state law. In fact, the Supreme Court has ruled that a
ratified treaty of the United States may pre-empt a state law that simply "impairs the
policy" of the treaty. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942); see also
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483, 488-90 (1879); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 277-80 (1796).
Professor Tribe states that "[u]nder the supremacy clause, it is indisputable that a
valid treaty overrides any conflicting state law, even on matters otherwise within state
control. Indeed, the treaty controls whether it is ratified before or after the enactment of
the conflicting state law." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 168
(1978) (footnotes omitted).
104 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
105 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
106 472 F. Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978).
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became operative as domestic law of the United States."' 0 7 Given the
detailed provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention and the lack of
language requiring implementing legislation, the Convention is a self-
executing treaty.
When a self-executing treaty and a federal statute conflict, the
doctrine of implied repeal asserts that the later-enacted will prevail.'0,
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "a treaty will not be
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless
such purpose on the part of. Congress has been clearly expressed.'
10 9
It is arguable whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
the standing of a federal statute vis-4-vis other federal statutes and trea-
ties.1 0 In any event, no amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure clearly expressing an intent to modify the Hague Evidence Con-
vention has been enacted since the ratification of the Convention in
1972. For example, Rule 28(b), which describes how depositions may
be taken in foreign countries, was last amended in 1963."11 According
to the doctrine of implied repeal, therefore, the later-enacted Hague
Evidence Convention, within its scope, supersedes the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The Supreme Court has also recognized and applied a "canon of
construction which teaches that the legislation of Congress, unless the
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." Such a rule of construction "is based
on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions.""' 2 Under this approach, the general discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed as applying
107 Id. at 542.
108 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. at 194; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600-01 (1889) (later act of Con-
gress forbidding Chinese laborers who had left U.S. from reentering supersedes previ-
ous treaties between U.S. and China covering same subject where conflicting); Edye v.
Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (later act of Congress regu-
lating immigration through imposition of head tax supersedes previously existing trea-
ties covering immigration to the extent they are inconsistent).
109 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933).
110 On the one hand, the Rules Enabling Act provides that "[a]ll laws in conflict
with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). On the other hand, this provi-
sion can be construed as applying only to the original rules, not to subsequent amend-
ments. In Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 554 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the
court held that "Congress' failure to suspend a proposed rule gives it the force not of a
legislative enactment, but of a regulation pursuant to the [Rules Enabling] Act." Id. at
1169 n.29.
IL" FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) advisory committee note (1963 amendments).
112 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). See also Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
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only within the territorial jurisdiction Pf the United States unless Con-
gress expressly indicates otherwise.
Finally, the conclusion that the Hague Evidence Convention over-
rides other mechanisms for obtaining foreign discovery is consistent
with a principle of both statutory construction and international conflict
of law doctrine: lex specialis derogat generali (a particular law prevails
over a general rule).""' Application of this principle leads to the conclu-
sion that the Hague Evidence Convention, a treaty designed to address
the specific problems of discovery from foreign countries, supersedes
rules governing the more general field of discovery of evidence for use
in United States courts.
CONCLUSION
The Hague Evidence Convention establishes an exclusive set of
procedures by which evidence situated in foreign states may be ob-
tained. Although a number of American courts have ruled otherwise, it
was the intention of the states participating in the Convention that an
exclusive mechanism for taking evidence be created. An examination of
the Rapporteur's Report, the subsequent positions of three important
signatory states, and various principles of treaty interpretation compel
this conclusion. As the supreme law of the land, the Hague Evidence
Convention may not be ignored by American courts and litigants seek-
ing evidence abroad.
American courts that by-pass the terms of the Convention in favor
of more familiar domestic discovery procedures unnecessarily exacer-
bate the tensions between differing judicial systems. One co-chairman
of the drafting committee of the Convention has stated that "[i]t was
not possible to ask the Continental countries to change their public pol-
icy and their legal traditions overnight and to permit the same kind of
free activity in their countries as we have permitted here."114 By recog-
nizing the exclusive nature of the Hague Evidence Convention, Ameri-
can courts will effectuate the intentions of its drafters and accord the
respect that is due to our partners in the treaty.
113 See Akehurst, The Hierachy of the Sources of International Law, 1974-75
BRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 273, 273.
114 Amram, supra note 13, at 655. See also 1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation,
supra note 12, at 806.
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